test(visibility): full suite green under RLS — sync paths, device-auth bridge, seed pool

Phase 5 (plan §7): the entire integration suite passes with the RLS
policies live. The suite was the triage enumerator the plan predicted:

- device_auth middleware: the THIRD identity bridge — KOReader/Kobo
  device-authenticated requests read media as the DEVICE OWNER
  (plan A9 called this path out; the flip was 404s on sync metadata).
- conflicts/analytics/progress handlers: detached
  context.Background() reads threaded to the request context (the
  requesting user's identity) — 12+ sites; resolve helpers take ctx.
- scanner: ScanFolders self-declares its configured admin identity
  (server maintenance, product-correct for any caller); generic job
  creation stamps the requesting admin.
- harness: setup.DBPool and the sync-test pool declare
  rls.SeedIdentity at SESSION scope via BeforeAcquire — the pool never
  serves a second identity, so no A3 bleed; setup.DB falls back to the
  seed identity (NewSeedDB) for ungoverned-context calls; filter tests
  use seedExec for raw governed-table statements.
- contract pin WIDENED (docs/contract_pins.md 2026-10-29): under RLS,
  item-scoped gates may answer 404 (row invisible — no existence leak)
  as well as 403 (Go-level checks on listings keep strict 403).
- TestWorker_JobStatusTracking — the pre-existing red from the Phase 0
  baseline — passes with the harness seed work; no product change.
This commit is contained in:
John O'Keefe committed 2026-10-29 10:14:08 -04:00
1 parent bb2cc26e9d
commit 4d697f5fcf
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@@ -289,7 +289,12 @@ func TestAudiobookTrackEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
resp, err := client.Do(req)
require.NoError(t, err)
_ = resp.Body.Close()
require.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, resp.StatusCode, "%s must be gated", path)
// PIN WIDENED for RLS (docs/contract_pins.md 2026-10-29): the
// handler's own Go-level gate still answers 403, but under
// engine-level visibility the hidden row is simply ABSENT —
// 404 is equally gated (no existence leak). Both accepted.
require.True(t, resp.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden || resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound,
"%s must be gated (403 or 404), got %d", path, resp.StatusCode)
}
// Restore visibility so harness cleanup ordering never sees a