The "top search bar doesn't work" report had TWO stacked causes, found
by reproducing with real keypress-by-keypress typing instead of
Playwright's fill() (which fires a single input event and masked both):
1. htmx.min.js was included PER PAGE. The header's live search is
htmx-driven on every page, but five pages rendering @Header —
series, admin, admin hash-conflicts, admin processing-issues,
browse-detail — never loaded it: the input's hx-* attributes were
inert (htmx-internal-data absent), so typing produced no request at
all. The include now lives in the header partial itself (classic
script, before the module bundle); the sixteen per-page copies on
@Header pages are removed (double-processing guard). Non-header
pages (login/register/setup/reader/index) keep their own.
2. htmx's delay: modifier on a PROGRAMMATICALLY dispatched custom event
(htmx.trigger) loses the request entirely under rapid successive
triggers — every re-fire canceled the pending timer and the last
never issued, so fast typing (the normal kind) never opened the
dropdown while one-shot fill() worked. The debounce moved into the
Alpine component (client-local state, where it belongs); htmx now
executes the bare `search` event immediately.
Also made bundle staleness structurally impossible: each bundle's
script stamp is a content hash computed at startup (templates/
bundles.go), so a rebuild that changes bundle bytes changes its cache
key with no manual ?v=N bump — the manual stamp was how the first
dropdown fix stayed invisible for a deploy. The reader bundle (never
stamped at all) is covered too. HTML pages additionally send
Cache-Control: no-cache (they are dynamic), so a stale page can no
longer reference a stale stamp; /api, /static and /uploads keep their
native caching, pinned by a middleware test.
script-src now allow-lists the guard by sha256 of its rendered bytes
(middleware.ScriptHashThemeFlashGuard) instead of 'unsafe-inline' — the
guard is the app's only inline <script>. security_headers_test.go renders
templates.ThemeFlashGuard() and fails with the replacement hash if the
script text ever drifts.
Executing anti-XSS strict CSP surfaced three latent violations the
eval-removal sweep couldn't see (hash mode is stricter than eval mode,
because inline event handler ATTRIBUTES now count against script-src):
1. admin_archived / admin_library: 15 native onclick=/onsubmit= handlers
(modal open/close, folder-browser picker, purge button) converted to
Alpine @click/@submit component methods — openCreateLibraryModal,
hideModal, pickBrowsePath added to the admin component;
purgeArchivedItems promoted from its window global into the component
and the (window as any) exposure removed.
2. dashboard/docs: onclick handlers converted — dashboard's
event.stopPropagation() → @click.stop; docs' sidebar/search closers →
closeDocsSidebar/closeSearchResults component methods.
3. 8 onerror= image-fallback attributes (cover placeholders app-wide +
audiobook cover hide) replaced by data-fallback attributes handled by
one delegated capture-phase listener in web/src/image_fallback.ts —
works for htmx-swapped content without re-binding.
Verified: theme guard applies a saved theme on public pages under the
hash CSP; 14-page authenticated sweep clean; admin pages clean under the
promoted admin; admin-library modal open/close bindings exercised;
readers render error-free; go build/vet/middleware-test, tsc, vp
check/test (146), build:ts all green.
John O'Keefe