The JWT middleware validated signature + expiry and fabricated the
request user purely from token claims, so a signature-valid token for a
DELETED user kept full API access until token expiry — observed live on
hardware (a phone session survived the test suite's user-table
recreation and kept serving its true empty sets; open handoff bug 1).
An ensureUserExistsMiddleware already existed but was only wired on the
frontend SSR group (frontend.go) — every /api group used bare
createJWTMiddleware. The existence check now lives INSIDE
createJWTMiddleware's SuccessHandler so every protected group (SSR and
API alike) gets it:
- After claim validation, GetUser by the token's user_id; a missing row
clears the token cookie and answers 401 user_not_found for API calls
(the app's TokenAuthenticator then re-logins with stored credentials)
or redirects to /login?session=invalid for page requests — same
shape-aware split the error handler already uses.
- Cost: one primary-key lookup per authenticated request (~0.2ms local);
instant revocation, no TTL semantics. The redundant SSR-only
middleware is deleted (its redirect behavior is preserved inside the
guard).
The guard exposed two processing-issues tests that were unknowingly
RELYING on ghost semantics: they nested a second setupTestServer whose
bootstrap deleted the first setup's regular user, then asserted 403
from the dead token. De-nested: a createLibraryDirect helper inserts
the library under the live setup's user, no second bootstrap.
New TestDeletedUserTokenRejected pins the contract: token works while
the user exists -> 401 user_not_found after deletion. Full suite: 219
groups, zero failures.
John O'Keefe
9cd6356892